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Abstract: Robust infrastructure networks are vital to ensure community resilience; their failure leads to severe societal disruption and they
have important postdisaster functions. However, as these networks consist of interconnected, but geographically-distributed, components,
system resilience is difficult to assess. In this paper the authors propose the use of an extension to the catastrophe (CAT) risk modeling
approach, which is primarily used to perform risk assessments of independent assets, to be adopted for these interdependent systems.
To help to achieve this, fragility curves, a crucial element of CAT models, are developed for overhead electrical lines using an empirical
approach to ascribe likely failures due to wind storm hazard. To generate empirical fragility curves for electrical overhead lines, a dataset of
over 12,000 electrical failures is coupled to a European reanalysis (ERA) wind storm model, ERA-Interim. The authors consider how the
spatial resolution of the electrical fault data affects these curves, generating a fragility curve with low resolution fault data with a R2 value of
0.9271 and improving this to a R2 value of 0.9889 using higher spatial resolution data. Recommendations for deriving similar fragility curves
for other infrastructure systems and/or hazards using the same methodological approach are also made. The authors argue that the developed
fragility curves are applicable to other regions with similar electrical infrastructure and wind speeds, although some additional calibration
may be required. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)NH.1527-6996.0000267. This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
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Introduction
Modern society’s reliance on critical infrastructure networks has
become so great that large-scale failure of these systems can have
catastrophic consequences, and even short-term disruptions can be
serious (Murray and Grubesic 2007). Electricity networks usually
occur as national or even continental scale systems, and so their
failure can be felt over a wide geographic area (Andersson et al.
2005; Sforna and Delfanti 2006) and the consequences can be
severe both on communities and other networks that depend on
them (Wilkinson et al. 2012). If the direct and indirect cost of dam-
age due to a natural disaster are considered as a proxy for the impact
that the disaster have, then the consequence of natural disasters on
infrastructure has been steadily increasing. This is due to both
increasing event frequency and our increasing reliance on the serv-
ices provided by our infrastructure (Kreimer and Arnold 2000;
Chang 2003). Therefore, methodologies to quantitatively assess
the vulnerability of these systems are needed, allowing an accurate
assessment of the impact of infrastructure failure. The current
scarcity of risk assessment and impact tools makes it difficult
for infrastructure owners and governments to make rational
investments to increase the resilience of their infrastructure systems
in the most efficient and effective manner.
Several models have been developed that attempt to quantita-
tively assess the vulnerability posed by natural hazards to infrastruc-
ture systems, such as Reed et al. (2009) and Salman and Li (2016).
However, the most notable are the Hazard U.S. (HAZUS) method-
ologies (Schneider and Schauer 2006). These models have been de-
veloped for flood, hurricane, and earthquake hazards and are
designed to produce loss estimates to be used by federal, state,
regional, and local governments in planning and preparing for these
natural hazards (Kircher et al. 2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Vickery
et al. 2006). The HAZUS methodology incorporates nearly all
aspects of the built environment, from general building stock to
critical infrastructure systems, and has a wide range of different
types of losses, including direct economic and social losses. In order
to achieve these estimations, extensive databases are embedded
within the HAZUS framework, including information regarding
demographic aspects of the population, square footage for different
occupancies of buildings, and numbers and locations of bridges
(HAZUS 2015a). However, by their own admission the estimates
made by this framework are likely to have uncertainties of “at best
a factor of two or more” (HAZUS 2015a, p. 29). There are a number
of factors contributing to this uncertainty, with a major one being the
damage models that are used to calculate expected damages. These
have been primarily produced by expert judgement and so are likely
to be subject to considerable bias and are unsuitable for application
to storms that are not in the historical knowledge of the expert.
Risk of failure of infrastructure systems is difficult to assess as
they are essentially a series of interconnected and interacting
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systems of assets, geographically distributed over regional, na-
tional, or even vast continental scales. However, a similar problem
of risk assessment of geographically dispersed assets has been
faced by the insurance industry. In this case, insurance managers
require methods to assess the risk to a geographically distributed
portfolio of assets (e.g., building stock). The most common meth-
odology of quantifying this risk is through the use of a catastrophe
(CAT) risk modeling approach. The CAT models are used to assess
risk by combining an exposure database together with a hazard
model, a vulnerability model, and an economic loss model (Fig. 1)
(Grossi and Kunreuther 2005). To apply this methodology to assess
the risk to an infrastructure system, it is first necessary to overcome
a number of challenges. First, there are few vulnerability models
for infrastructure systems. Vulnerability functions express the like-
lihood that assets at risk will sustain varying degrees of loss (e.g., in
terms of direct damage) over a range of hazard intensities. In some
cases, developing vulnerability relationships requires the use of:
(1) fragility functions, expressing the likelihood of different levels
of damage (i.e., damage states) sustained by a given building class
over a range of hazard intensities; and (2) damage-to-loss functions,
which convert the damage estimates to loss estimates. In the
insurance industry, vulnerability functions are usually formed
empirically by correlating insurance claim information from pre-
vious events with the estimated hazard intensity at the location
of the asset. Examples of infrastructure fragility functions are
sparse because infrastructure is typically self-insured and therefore
there is no insurance claim information with which to calibrate
those functions. Furthermore, as they are not insured, there are
few incentives for risk analysts to produce fragility and vulnerabil-
ity functions by other means (e.g., analytically or through expert
judgement). Secondly, economic models must be developed to
quantify loss. While this is relatively straightforward for a portfolio
of independent assets (such as buildings), it is far more difficult for
an infrastructure system where failure of one asset has implications
for the whole system (and in some cases interdependent infrastruc-
ture systems). It is not the cost of the damaged asset that is of
primary importance, but rather the value of the service (e.g., elec-
trical or water supply) that these systems provide.
While applying a CAT model type approach to infrastructure
has its difficulties, it also has its attractions because, unlike
traditional CAT models, the exposure database and the economic
loss model have less uncertainty associated with them. For exam-
ple, in the case of electricity networks, the utility operator usually
has a very accurate asset database and understands exactly the
exposure (loss of income or potential fines) they may receive
for failing to supply consumers. For the hazard model, the same
event-based models used by the insurance industry can be adopted
(although as infrastructure networks may be geographically distrib-
uted on national, or even continental, scales they may need to
increase the area of the hazard considered). This only leaves the vul-
nerability models as the last missing piece of a CAT model that can
assess the resilience of infrastructure. In the assessment of the resil-
ience of infrastructure networks, it is the value of the service that the
network provides that is of primary concern, rather than the capital
cost of the infrastructure itself. This means that resilience is a com-
bination of the fragility of the assets and the time to repair failed
assets. In this paper only fragility is considered, as the time of repair
is primarily an operational decision involving reserves of labor and
material and these will vary considerably between different opera-
tors, whereas fragility is dependent on the specification of the asset
and its maintenance program. While these do vary between opera-
tors, operators tend to adopt similar specifications for their assets.
This paper argues the case for developing catastrophe type
models for electrical distribution networks. A methodology is
developed to produce empirical fragility curves for individual infra-
structure assets using the example of overhead line (OHL) compo-
nents of an electrical distribution system subjected to wind storm
hazard. To achieve this, a large empirical database of fault
information, namely the National Fault and Interruption Scheme
(NaFIRS) reporting database, which is collected by the United
Kingdom electrical distribution network operators is used to derive
the fragility curves. The accuracy of these fragility curves is
also explored by considering how their accuracy increases as the
precision of the information used to derive them improves.
Vulnerability and Fragility Curve Methodologies and
Data Requirements
Fragility curves define the relationship between the probability of
exceeding a particular damage state (or performance) of an infra-
structure component, and the intensity of the applied hazard,
whereas vulnerability curves define the relationship between ex-
pected losses (such as economic losses) and this same intensity.
Exceeding a particular damage state is often termed failure and
is usually defined to be when “the capacity of a structure to provide
a designated level of service has been exceeded” (Schultz et al.
2010, p. 4); it does not necessarily imply the total, or catastrophic,
failure of the structure. Obviously, fragility functions and vulner-
ability functions are closely related and can usually be converted
Fig. 1. (Color) Typical catastrophe risk (CAT) modeling framework, consisting of an exposure database (exposure information), hazard model (event
generation and intensity calculation), vulnerability model (damage estimation), and an economic loss model (consequence calculation) (adapted
from Grossi and Kunreuther 2005; Risk Management Solutions 2008)
© ASCE 04017019-2 Nat. Hazards Rev.
 Nat. Hazards Rev., 2018, 19(1): 04017019 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 a
sc
el
ib
ra
ry
.o
rg
 b
y 
92
.0
.1
84
.2
4 
on
 1
1/
28
/1
7.
 C
op
yr
ig
ht
 A
SC
E.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y;
 al
l r
ig
ht
s r
es
er
ve
d.
using an economic or other model. In this paper, the damage state
of interest is when damage to an electricity component is sufficient
that it could result in an interruption to electricity supply, regardless
of duration or number of customers impacted. These damages can
be expressed as a fragility function by expressing failures as a prob-
ability, or more usefully (as the authors have done) by expressing
them as a number of interruptions normalized by the length of over-
head line in the asset database. As the components in an electricity
network are the lines between electricity poles, then the faults/km
presented in this paper can easily be converted to probabilities by
dividing them by the average length of overhead lines between
poles (in this case approximately 80 m).
Fragility curves were initially introduced and developed for con-
ducting seismic risk assessments at nuclear power plants (Kennedy
et al. 1980; Kaplan et al. 1983), and currently the majority of
publications developing (or using) fragility curves are still in the
area of seismic risk assessment. This includes studies by Basoz
and Kiremidjian (1997), who developed fragility curves using
observations of bridge damage following the Northridge earth-
quake that struck Los Angeles in 1994; Lin (2008), who developed
fragility curves for frame structures exposed to seismic loads; and
more generally Porter et al. (2007). While fragility curves for
insured assets such as housing stock have been developed for
the insurance industry, for other hazards, including flooding and
hurricanes [e.g., Ellingwood et al. (2004) who developed fragility
curves for lightweight wood frame structures exposed to hurricane
winds] examples of vulnerability models for infrastructure systems
are limited.
Fragility curves for individual assets within electrical power net-
works do exist, but tend to be very specific in their application and
also do not consider how the resolution of data used to derive them
impacts the resultant curve. For example, Davidson et al. (2003)
uses empirical data to construct fragility curves for transformers
subjected to hurricane events, and Reed et al. (2010) correlates
wind speed data from Hurricane Rita with electricity outages. In
their studies, Winkler et al. (2010) and Ouyang and Duenas-Osorio
(2014) define fragility curves for hurricane events. Ryan et al.
(2014) and Bjarnadottir et al. (2013) derive analytical fragility
curves for wooden power poles subjected to wind storm events.
Fragility curves have also been developed in the HAZUS
methodology for numerous infrastructure assets (including electri-
cal substations and generation facilities) but these are limited to
earthquake hazard only (HAZUS 2015b, c). While HAZUS present
a complete framework for assessing infrastructure risk, the majority
of the relationships between hazard intensity and impact were
obtained using expert judgement, which may be subject to signifi-
cant biases. For example, the judgement of experts may not be
transferable to other regions and may not be extrapolated to more
severe events that they have witnessed.
There are four broad approaches to developing fragility curves,
each with their own advantages and disadvantages (Jeong and
Elnashai 2007).
Judgmental Approaches
This approach develops fragility curves based on some form of ex-
pert opinion, or judgement, and tends to only be used as a last resort
when it is not possible to use other approaches because of the lack
of obtainable observational data and models, for example. The
primary advantage of this approach is that it is not limited by
the quantity and quality of available data; conversely, the primary
disadvantage of this approach is the lack of data that can be used
to validate results. This approach can be biased by the opinion of
the expert; e.g., an expert’s opinion may be influenced by their
individual experience, which itself is influenced by factors specific
to the location where they work (Jeong and Elnashai 2007). If these
factors are known it may be possible to correct the results; however,
this can be difficult because of the number of influencing factors,
which may differ for each expert, meaning that many biases are
undetected.
Empirical Approaches
Using this approach, fragility curves are developed using
observational or empirical data. These observations may be ob-
tained through controlled experiments or may be collected in an
ad hoc fashion (e.g., through the survey of structures after a
catastrophic event). Databases containing this information may be
difficult to analyze statistically. Observational data may be highly
specific to the source situation, or location, and only contain data
for events captured over the monitoring period. This is the most
commonly used approach for evaluating fragility curves for
mechanical, electrical, and electronic parts, as it is relatively easy
to replicate parts and test them to failure (Schultz et al. 2010); how-
ever, it is generally limited to situations where a sufficient quantity
of data can be collected.
Analytical Approaches
The analytical approach uses structural models that characterize
the performance limits of the structure. In assessing the performance
of the structure, several basic variables are used to determine the
capacity of the structure to withstand the applied load and also
the demand placed on the structure. This usually includes the
material properties, the dimensions of the structure (or individual
components), and may also include environmental variables, such
as temperature and/or humidity, which may impact on the capacity
of the structure. These variables are then used to construct the limit-
state equation,which is expressed as the difference between capacity
and demand. However, the structural characteristics, load-structure
interactions, and structure-environment interactions can be difficult
to model analytically and these models are difficult to validate.
Hybrid Approaches
A hybrid approach to developing fragility curves uses a combina-
tion of two or more of the previous three approaches in an attempt
to overcome their limitations (Jeong and Elnashai 2007). Empirical
approaches tend to be limited by the availability of observational
data, while judgmental approaches can be biased by expert
assessments and analytical approaches can be limited by modeling
deficiencies or be computationally inefficient. To overcome these
limitations, judgmental or analytical approaches can be combined
with observational data from the empirical approach to improve the
robustness of the fragility curve and produce confidence bounds on
estimates of the probability of failure [as achieved by Singhal and
Kiremidjian (1998)].
In this paper, an empirical approach is used to develop a series of
the fragility curves for overhead line components of an electrical
distribution system. In this case, observations are formed of
recorded electrical faults, held in a national database reporting
database (the NaFIRS database).
Structure of the United Kingdom Electricity System
and NaFIRS Empirical Fault Data
In the United Kingdom and many other regions of the world, there
are two primary infrastructure systems that facilitate the transfer of
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electricity from where it is generated (e.g., coal, gas or oil power
plants, hydroelectric plants, or wind farms) to where it is required
by industrial, commercial, or domestic consumers. The first system
is the electrical transmission network, owned by the National Grid
in England and Wales, which carries electricity from the generators
to grid supply points situated at numerous locations around the
country at high voltages between 400 and 275 kV (Fig. 2). This
is achieved primarily through the use of overhead lines, supported
by steel transmission towers or underground cables. To give a sense
of the scale of this network, it consists of around 7,000 km of over-
head lines and 22,000 transmission towers (National Grid 2014).
From these grid supply points, the electricity is transferred to the
distribution network. This distribution network is formed of
nine regional grids that are responsible for delivering power to
industrial, commercial, and domestic users. These networks again
consist of a series of overhead lines, supported by either steel tow-
ers or timber poles, underground cables, and a range of substations
at different voltages. They are owned and operated by the district
network operators (DNOs), who are also responsible for the oper-
ation and maintenance of the individual assets (e.g., towers, cables,
and substations) that form their networks. In the United Kingdom
the DNOs are not responsible for selling electricity to consumers,
this is done by the electricity suppliers.
United Kingdom electricity companies, which are private organ-
izations, collect data on faults in the NaFIRS database as part of
their regulation criteria set out by the government. This database
contains details of over 200,000 wind related faults on the United
Kingdom electrical distribution system, including date, time, and
number of consumers affected, among others. Data from the
NaFIRS database from April 1, 2003 to December 31, 2010 is used
to consider the impact that wind storm hazards have on the
overhead line components operated by one DNO in the United
Kingdom, during which time there are approximately 12,000 faults.
The data in this time period is audited and therefore likely to be of
greater accuracy. The faults to the 132–11 kV overhead line
components (e.g., grid supply point to distribution substation level,
see Fig. 2) are considered, rather than the lower voltage supplies to
individual domestic and commercial properties, as the robustness
of this section is of a high importance to the DNOs. Individual
faults in this section of the network have the potential to impact
a large number of consumers, whereas faults occurring below
the distribution substation are likely to impact on a very small
number of consumers.
While the NaFIRS database provides a comprehensive overview
of the fault statistics, from an energy operator’s perspective, it is
missing two key components to enable accurate vulnerability
analysis. First, the database does not record the intensity of the
hazard that caused the fault (e.g., wind speed), and second, the
exact location of the fault is not recorded. The fault location is re-
corded in terms of the DNO (covering approximately 60,000 km2),
which is further split into smaller geographic zones, which in this
paper are referred to as areas (covering approximately 2,000 km2).
Therefore, in this paper several assumptions are made in order to
obtain the likely wind speed that caused each individual fault and
assess the extra precision that accurate fault location information
can provide.
Wind Hazard Model
Following the traditional approach used in probabilistic CAT mod-
eling, hazard modeling consists of: (1) simulating representative,
or stochastic, catastrophic events (e.g., earthquakes, storms/
precipitations) in time and space, i.e., a database of scenarios (event
generation); and (2) assessing the resulting hazard intensity
(e.g., intensity of ground motion, flood depth and velocity, wind
speed, etc.) across a geographical area at risk by propagating a
given event across the affected region (local intensity calculation).
Each event is usually defined by a specific magnitude (i.e., its
severity), location, and probability of occurring (or event rate)
based on historical data and the scientific understanding of the
highly complex physical phenomena of natural hazards (to supple-
ment the scarcity of historical data). To produce fragility curves it is
then necessary to convert the magnitude of an event with a
particular probability of occurrence into intensities over the area
of interest. For this study, as the wind is always blowing (although
the wind speed may be negligible) there is a need to define the
existence and duration of a storm event and a method of producing
relevant wind intensities. The high spatial variability of wind and
the number of factors that lead to this variability means that it is
difficult to produce a simple equation for wind intensity for
different locations due to individual storms; instead an alternative
approach is used.
Hourly records of observed wind are recorded at a number of
locations by the U.K. Met Office. These records comprise both
hourly mean wind and hourly maximum gust data, where gust
Fig. 2. Typical electricity supply chain for the United Kingdom (adapted from Energy Networks Association 2011)
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is averaged over a 3-s interval. However, not all of these records are
simultaneous or continuous and there are often large periods of
time with no data. There are also large areas of the United Kingdom
that are not covered by an observation station (e.g., the west of
Scotland and the majority of Wales).
Therefore, the observed data is supplemented with a downscal-
ing of the European reanalysis (ERA)-Interim dataset (Dee et al.
2011) (Fig. 3). The reason for this is that as reanalysis data is
produced by forecast models and data assimilation systems to
reanalyze archived observations; therefore, they are data sets that
describe the recent history of the atmosphere, land surface, and
oceans on a regular gird (in the case of ERA-Interim, approxi-
mately 80 km). This process has the added advantage of produc-
ing proxy data where there may no observations (i.e., each gird
square). The downscaling used in this paper converts the required
atmospheric lateral boundary conditions, sea surface tempera-
tures, and sea ice cover over ocean surfaces for an evaluation run
of a high-resolution (12 km) atmospheric model, RACMO22
(Meijgaard et al. 2012), to provide 10 m maximum gust (over
3 s) at 6-h intervals. The ERA-Interim boundary conditions can
be considered to be of very high quality (Dee et al. 2011), particu-
larly in the northern hemisphere extratropics where reanalysis
uncertainty is negligible (Brands et al. 2013). The downscaling
is achieved using RACMO22 forced by ERA-Interim data from
1979 to 2011, from the CORDEX model ensemble run over Europe
(Jacob et al. 2013; Kotlarski et al. 2014). This provides local
estimates of wind speed suitable for impact studies (e.g., Fowler
et al. 2007 for discussion on downscaling), particularly where
observations are not available. Wilkinson et al. (2014) established
that the bias between observations and RACMO22 output is small:
below 3 ms−1 for all quantiles of the distribution. The location of
data, for both RACMO22, ERA-Interim, and observation stations
are shown in Fig. 3. For further information the reader is directed to
Wilkinson et al. (2014).
Development of Vulnerability Model
Now the wind hazard model with the exposure database and fault
data are brought together to develop fragility curves for overhead
line components of electrical distribution infrastructure. The
authors have chosen to use this as an example but could equally
have chosen another infrastructure system or hazard to demonstrate
the new methodology. An assessment of how the accuracy of the
fragility curve improves as the precision (or resolution) of the data
used to derive them increases is also made. Although fragility
curves are developed, unlike traditional fragility curves that present
the impact to infrastructure assets in terms of the probability of
failure, the number of assets failed=km due to the hazard are
presented. This is a more useable and understandable measure
for infrastructure owners and operators and can be converted to
probabilities by dividing by the average length of overhead lines
between poles (in this case approximately 80 m).
The data is aggregated to three different resolutions, but approx-
imately the same methodology is used for each. In all methods,
individual wind storms are initially identified based on a threshold
value of wind speed. There are numerous studies that have consid-
ered the identification of a threshold value for severe weather
events, including wind storms. The majority of these studies have
focused on the analysis of indices of climate extremes based solely
on observational or reanalysis data, including those of Klawa and
Ulbrich (2003) and Bonazzi et al. (2012). Other studies have de-
fined and classified severe weather events by investigating both the
magnitude of the event and also the damage caused to infrastruc-
ture. For example, Vajda et al. (2013) defined three different thresh-
old parameters for severe weather events on the basis of the
observed level of damage of previous recorded events (e.g., minor,
mild, and severe damage). In this paper, the lower threshold of
damage defined by Vajda et al. (2013) is used to identify wind
storm events: wind storm occurs when wind speed >17 m=s.
Within these individual wind storms the number of faults that have
occurred are identified and deemed to be caused by the maximum
wind speed in that storm event (Fig. 4).
The authors acknowledge that not all of the faults during the
storm event will be caused by the maximum wind speed. However,
by analyzing a number of storms in the dataset, it has been found
that the majority of faults occur within the same 6-h time period as
the maximum wind speed of the storm or within the short-term
aftermath (and therefore are likely to have been significantly weak-
ened by the high wind speeds during the storm event).
In the first method a low resolution, publicly available (although
potentially at a cost), wind data is used to identify the maximum
wind speed occurring in the DNO during a wind storm event. In the
second method, the 12-km resolution RACMO22 wind data is used
to estimate the failure wind speed for faults in individual areas. This
is achieved by creating individual time series data for each of the
areas and selecting the maximum in the storm events. Finally in the
third method, the highest resolution data is used to obtain wind
speeds associated with faults at the primary substation circuit where
the fault occurred. This information is also used to split the faults
into those occurring in urban and rural areas, to determine if the
basic land use information can improve the precision of the fragility
curves. In all three approaches an overview of the detailed
methodology and data sets used to derive the fragility curves is
given. All fragility curves are presented as plots of the mean
Fig. 3. (Color) Locations of United Kingdom wind observation sta-
tions (dark red dots) and grid cell corners for ERA-Interim reanalysis
(black crosses) and the 12-km RACMO22 Regional Climate Model
(block dots) (adapted from Wilkinson et al. 2014)
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number of faults=km against the intensity of the hazard (e.g., wind
speed). For an introduction to fragility curves the reader is directed
to Schultz et al. (2010), and for detailed guidance in developing
them to Porter et al. (2007) or Rossetto et al. (2014).
Method 1: Low Resolution Approach
In the first method, fragility curves are calculated using information
that would be readily obtainable by most organizations. In this
method, all meteorological stations owned by the U.K. Met Office
within the DNO region are identified (a total of 31 stations) and
construct a time series of wind maxima using the maximum wind
speed at each time interval. The 12-km RACMO22 atmospheric
model output is used at the grid cell nearest to the relevant
station to fill in any missing data in the observations. For the fault
information all of the fault data within the NaFIRS database for the
DNO in question from April 1, 2003 to December 31, 2010 is used.
To construct the fragility curve the method previously discussed
(to identify individual wind storms and the number of faults
associated with each) is used and the maximum wind speed in each
wind storm is binned to the nearest integer, enabling the mean
number of faults caused by each wind speed value to be calculated.
Using this method a total of 766 individual wind storms is obtained
and the average for each integer value of wind speed is plotted,
before fitting a trend line to obtain the shape of the fragility curve,
as shown in Fig. 5. Note that wind storms that have not resulted in
any recorded faults are included in this average and in subsequent
calculations.
The primary advantage of this method is that only two statistics
for each wind storm hazard are required in order to calculate the
fragility curve, namely the maximum wind speed of each storm
and the number of faults that the storm caused. This information
is usually publicly available and relatively easy to obtain.
The fragility curve for this method is shown in Fig. 5, in terms of
the number of faults recorded normalized by the length of overhead
line cables (in km). From this figure, it is shown that overhead lines
are generally resilient to wind storm hazards, experiencing a very
small number of faults (and also small number of customers
affected), when subjected to wind speeds of less than 20 m=s.
However, they become more susceptible to damage as the wind
speed increases to more than 30 m=s, showing an increase in the
number of faults.
This information can be combined with the fault data to generate
the graph shown in Fig. 6, which plots the proportion of storms
causing a fault for each integer value of wind speed. From this
figure, it is shown that storms with a maximum wind speed of
greater than 21 m=s are almost certain to cause at least one fault
to overhead line infrastructure. Note that there are only a few wind
storms with a maximum wind speed of greater than 30 m=s from
2003 to 2011.
There are also a small proportion of faults (10%) that occur be-
low the threshold value of wind storms of 17 m=s and are therefore
not included in the calculation of fragility curves. These faults
could be attributable to errors in the database, human error at
the time of recording the fault, or due to the RACMO22 model
not capturing localized wind speeds, among others.
Fig. 5. Fragility curves using Method 1: (a) the maximum wind speed in each individual wind storm, binned to the nearest integer against the number
of faults recorded in each storm (gray dots) and the average number of faults occurring for storms of each given intensity (black dots); a power-law
trend line has been fitted through the average number of faults (black line) and the R2 value is shown; (b) for clarity, the individual data points (gray
dots) have been removed; in both graphs the number of faults recorded in each wind storm has been normalized by the total length of overhead line
components in the DNO (in kilometers)
Fig. 4. (Color) Example of the identification of individual wind storms
and the faults occurring within their time frame; in this example there
are two wind storms, the first shown by the blue line (occurring
between 33 and 147 h) and the second by the green line (occurring
between 253 and 280 h)—identified when the wind speed crosses
the 17 m=s threshold line (dotted line); the first wind storm causes
a total of 50 faults (shown by the blue triangles) and are assumed
to have been used by the maximum 29 m=s wind speed recorded in
this storm; in the second wind storm (green) nine faults are caused
by a wind speed of 19 m=s
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The standard deviation for the number of faults occurring for
each wind storm is also considered (shown in Fig. 7). This measure
indicates a large scatter in the results particularly for wind storms
with a wind speed greater than 25 m=s. This indicates that although
there are on average more faults occurring for higher wind speeds
there is also more uncertainty around the exact number of faults
recorded. Note that the standard deviation for the wind storms with
a higher mean number of faults may be skewed because of their
higher mean values and also the smaller number of data points
(as indicated in Fig. 6).
Method 2: High Resolution Approach
In this approach, an investigation to determine how more precise
weather and fault information may be used to improve the fragility
curves is undertaken. While the fault information in the NaFIRS
database is accurate, it has relatively low spatial precision. It is re-
corded that a fault occurs somewhere within an area in the DNO
region (approximately 2,000 km2). While this smaller area is re-
corded in the NaFIRS database, the location and boundary of this
area must be obtained from the DNOs. This location data has been
obtained for our case study DNO (consisting of 32 areas) and it is
now used to provide more accurate identification of the maximum
wind speed associated with each fault.
In this instance a time series data for each of the 32 areas within
this study DNO is created and the meteorological station (owned by
the U.K. Met Office) closest to the spatial center of each area is
identified. The closest grid cell from the RACMO22 output is used
to create time series data (due to incomplete meteorological station
datasets). The maximum wind speed and number of faults for each
storm are then identified before being normalized by the length of
overhead lines in each area. This enables the combination of the
data to form one fragility curve for the whole DNO area. The au-
thors do this as the aim is to create one fragility curve for all over-
head line components and not a specific curve for components in
each small area. Similar to the previous method, the wind data is
binned to the nearest integer to enable the mean number of faults for
each wind speed value to be calculated. This average is then plot-
ted, before fitting a trend line to obtain the fragility curve, shown in
Fig. 8. Using this method 9,168 wind storms are recorded, signifi-
cantly more than the 766 recorded using Method 1. This is because
time series data is used for each area and not for the whole DNO
region; consequently, the same storm may be counted twice if it
occurred over more than one area. Note that the maximum wind
speed recorded using Method 1 was 38 m=s and the maximum re-
corded using Method 2 was 37 m=s. There was one instance of a
38 m=s storm in Method 1, recorded at one RACMO22 grid cell,
but this grid cell is not used in Method 2 as it is not the closest to the
center of an area.
The fragility curve calculated using this method, plotted in
Fig. 8, shows a similar curve to that calculated using Method 1.
On average, a low number of faults are recorded for overhead line
components for wind speeds lower than 20 m=s, but show an in-
crease in the number of faults recorded as wind speeds increase,
particularly to greater than 30 m=s. However, it is shown that there
are clearly identifiable differences in the fragility curves obtained
using each method. It appears that Method 1 significantly under-
estimates the fragility of overhead line components (as there are
fewer failures using this method for the lower wind speed storms).
This is because this method overestimating the failure wind speeds
of each component. Method 1 assumes that wind fault is caused by
Fig. 6. Plot of the proportion of wind storms when a fault occurred;
also shown are the frequency of wind storms for each maximum value
of storm wind speed
Fig. 7. Plot of the standard deviation for the number of faults occurring
for each wind storm when the maximum value of wind speed is binned
to the nearest integer
Fig. 8. Plot of the average number of faults occurring for wind storms
against the maximum wind speed recorded in each storm, binned to the
nearest integer, and calculated using Method 1 (open dots) and Method
2 (filled dots); the faults have been calculated in terms of faults per km
of overhead lines; a power-law trend line has been fitted through both
data sets and the R2 values are shown
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the maximum wind speed in the whole DNO region; however, this
method does not account for the range of wind speeds occurring
throughout the region (most of which will be lower). More precise
spatial information allows for the correction of this and from the
results it can be concluded that this information is required to
produce accurate fragility curves.
For this method, the standard deviation for the number of faults
occurring for each wind storm is also considered, shown in Fig. 9.
In a similar manner to Method 1, the standard deviation increases as
the maximum wind speed increases. The standard deviations cal-
culated for Method 2 are higher than those obtained for Method 1.
This counterintuitive result is likely because Method 1 averages the
results over a much larger area and therefore smooths out the local
effects, such as variations in the wind climate that result from local-
ized topographies, variations in the age of the infrastructure, and/or
variations in land usage. The important point is that although
Method 2 has a greater dispersion about the mean, the mean is
a much better fit for the data and therefore results in better estimates
of failures. Note that, in a similar manner to Method 1, there are
only a few instances of high wind speeds recorded and therefore the
standard deviations for these wind storms may be skewed because
of the smaller number of data points.
Method 3: Land Usage Approach
In this paper, one final approach is considered to determine the im-
provement that incorporating simple land usage information has, if
any, to the precision of the fragility curves for overhead line com-
ponents. To achieve this more accurate spatial information is
needed in order to categorize each overhead line component into
either an urban or rural environment. Individual DNOs may keep
more accurate fault/spatial information and, in this case, data that
enables each individual fault to its primary substation (of which
there are approximately 900 in the whole DNO region) has been
obtained. The land use for each substation is categorized by plot-
ting its location on ArcGIS software and using CORINE land usage
data to visually identify whether it is located in an urban or rural
environment. The same time series data as in Method 2 is used (and
therefore have the same storm information) but the faults occurring
in each storm are divided to those in urban or rural environments.
Data regarding accurate electrical circuit information is not
obtainable, and therefore the length of overhead line components
supported by each primary substation cannot be calculated. As
such, Thiessen polygons are used to identify the closest primary
substation to each overhead line component and this is used to
approximate the length of overhead line components supported
by each substation (it is likely that substations will support the
overhead lines closest to them). This information is used to normal-
ize the number of faults for each wind storm (for the two land use
categories) before combining the data into two fragility curves
(i.e., for the urban and rural land usage). Again the integer value
of wind speed is used and the mean is calculated, which is plotted
in Fig. 10.
From Fig. 10, it is shown that there is little difference between
the fragility curves obtained using this method (splitting the faults
for land use) and Method 2 (using the higher resolution wind
speed data). This indicates that the location of the overhead line
component, in terms of urban or rural environment (defined
by CORINE) makes little difference to its fragility to an applied
wind speed. This may seem surprising, as it could be expected
that more faults would occur in a rural environment and also sec-
ondary impacts exacerbating the number of faults (e.g., falling
trees); however, this is not supported by the evidence when using
CORINE land use data. Similarly the dispersion in the results for
both Method 3 datasets is similar for Method 2 and therefore a
pooled Method 3 dataset will have no improvement over
Method 2. This is likely because of the very localized nature of
wind and localized nature of tree cover (which is the primary cause
of faults) or because of the dispersion in the assets themselves being
of the same or greater order than the variability in the environmental
hazard.
Again, the standard deviation for the number of faults occurring
for each wind storm is considered, plotted in Fig. 11. From this
figure, it is shown that the standard deviation shows that there
is more scatter for Method 3, particularly for higher values of wind
speed (Fig. 11). This difference is likely because Method 3 is more
Fig. 9. Plot of the standard deviation for the number of faults occurring
for each wind storm when the maximum value of wind speed is binned
to the nearest integer, calculated using Method 1 (open dots) and
Method 2 (filled dots)
Fig. 10. Plot of the average number of faults occurring for wind storms
against the maximum wind speed recorded in each storm, binned to the
nearest integer, calculated using Method 2 (open dots) and Method 3
(filled dots); a power-law trend line has been fitted through both data
sets and the R2 values are shown
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sensitive to local effects, including localized topographies, com-
pared to Method 2.
Conclusions
Hazard U.S. has developed a multihazard loss estimation method-
ology for use in assessing potential losses to infrastructure and
other parts of the built environment (e.g., building stock). By their
own admission the estimates made by this framework are likely to
have an uncertainty of “at best a factor of two or more” (HAZUS
2015a). There are a number of factors contributing to this uncer-
tainty, with a major one being the damage models that are used to
calculate expected damages. These have been primarily produced
through expert judgement and so are subject to considerable
bias and are unsuitable for application to storms that are not in
the historical record of the expert.
In this paper the authors have developed a new methodology for
calculating fragility curves for overhead line components of
electrical distribution networks subjected to wind storm hazard.
While this paper is restricted to this asset, the method presented
could equally have been applied to another infrastructure system
subjected to the same hazard. The fragility curves developed in this
paper could be incorporated into future catastrophe risk models of
electricity infrastructure (e.g., Grossi and Kunreuther 2005) to give
an indication of the response of a system to an applied wind storm
hazard.
The method uses a dataset of over 12,000 wind related faults in
electricity distribution infrastructure and the associated date, time,
number of consumers involved, and the duration of the fault and
this data has been correlated with a high-resolution reanalysis
model to obtain fragility curves for electricity distribution infra-
structure subjected to wind storm.
These fragility curves are developed using three methodologies
to assess how their precision improves as the resolution of the data
used to derive them increases. It was found that precise spatial in-
formation is required to produce accurate fragility curves and that
using imprecise information can lead to an underestimation of the
fragility of infrastructure components. It was also found that using
simple land usage information to form fragility curves for faults in
an urban and rural environment does not significantly alter the
resultant curves. This is may be attributable to the very localized
nature of wind and localized nature of tree cover (which is the main
cause of faults) or due to the dispersion in the assets fragility being
of the same or greater order than the variability in the environmental
hazard. To further improve the fragility curves presented in this
paper would require very accurate fault location information,
higher resolution wind and land use models, and/or more informa-
tion on the asset (such as age); however, these are currently not
available.
Although this dataset is a United Kingdom dataset, the authors
argue that it could be used for any region with similar infrastructure
and for wind speeds up to 37 m=s (however, there is greater un-
certainty associated with higher wind speeds). As all but a handful
of failures of this large data set are simple electricity cables strung
between power poles, even if the lines were a different specification
it would be a relatively simple process to calibrate the presented
fragility curves so they are suitable for different overhead line
specifications (although it is accepted that this would increase
the uncertainty associated with the curves).
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